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3The Social Dimension of Liberal Policy
Liberalism is being identified – and rightly so – with policies centering
on the individual, his right to freedom and his responsibility. It is
emphasising efficiency, competition, and economic progress within the
framework of a market economy where the power of the state is limited
to an indispensable minimum.
Such liberal policies, which appeal to self-determination and responsibility
of the individual, have often been criticised for lacking a social dimension.
Thoughtless contrasting of the individual and society, the market and
ethics, the achievement principle and social justice, leads to the re-
proach of liberal indifference towards social concerns.
The misunderstanding of Liberalism’s “social coldness“ can only arise
among those who identify social policies with the state systems of social
security. Long-standing habit then leads to the erroneous assumption of
an identity of the improvement of social policy with the very expansion
of the state system of social security. And when Liberals refuse to fall
into the trap of such a narrow concept of social policy, they are accused
of Economic Liberalism without a social dimension.
As long as the point is to  lament the conspicuous absence of the Liberals
on the barricades of the struggle for a further expansion of the compulsory
collective systems of social security, the reproach could  almost be
perceived to be justified. But this approach is simply besides the point.
Liberal Policy is Inherently Social
Liberalism rejects the very expansion of mandatory insurance systems,
the socialisation of private risks, and the nationalisation of altruism. It
rejects the tutelage and incapacitation of the citizen by a caring authority
and the cultivation of an entitlement mentality.
Unfortunately it is often overlooked that liberal policy aims at a model of
society where social questions are not primarily an addition to processes
of the market, a mere corrective of market forces, limited more or less to
the systems of social security.
4Rather, liberal policy envisages a social and economic order which is
intrinsically social. Liberal policy is inherently social not only because it
aims at giving the citizens the freedom to look responsibly after their
own well-being within a market economy without tutelage by the state
and without discrimination. It is also inherently social because it strives
for a legal and economic order determining a frame of action which
ensures that what is good for the individual is generally also good for
society. The social dimension of liberal policy  means that the individual
accepts responsibility for himself and his family according to his capacity,
and it unfolds in the quality of “reciprocal effects where working for
one’s own objectives at the same time enhances the objectives of the
others“ (Simmel).
Competition and the System of Rules
These reciprocal effects are not only assured by the fact that exchange
and cooperation within free markets are only taking place when they
benefit all participants. Also, the legal and economic order as the
foundation of the social dimension of liberal policy lays down the rules
and the minimum norms, which ensure the congruence of individual
actions with the common good1. It is the undisputed merit of the “Ordo-
Liberals“ of the Freiburg School around Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm2
to have perceived the importance of a legal and economic order for the
market processes. They understood the function of the economic and
competitive order, whose laws are duly to be set by society in the political
process. However, institutions like the economic order need for their
interpretation a lining of tradition3. The ethics of the market have a
decisive part in this interplay. They have been developed by the market
society itself, partly found their way into legislation, and largely
correspond to the ethics of the civil society4.
1 Karl Homann/Eckart Blome-Drees, Unternehmensethik, Managementethik, in: Die Betriebs-
wirtschaft 55/1995, p.98 ff.
2 Eucken and Böhm taught at the University of Freiburg i.B., Germany
3 Karl Popper, In Search of a Better World, London 1952, p. 155 ff.
4 Herbert Giersch, Moral als Standortfaktor, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.12.1994;
H. Müller-Groeling, Ethik und Markt, in: liberal 38/1, 1996, p. 59 ff.
5In spite of all the lament about the decline of ethics and the controversies
regarding the design of the economic and legal order, markets are by no
means unbridled. Of course, they have to be kept free from excessive
state interference and overregulation. Such interference and over-
regulation can be found in the labour and housing markets and in the
state-sponsored statutory insurance systems, and they produce sclerotic
phenomena in economy as well as society. But markets also have to be
protected from cartels, monopolies, and market domination to maintain
their capacity to function as an instrument of choices, of non-
discrimination, and – last not least – of restraint of power. Normally,
open markets and international competition are more effective
instruments for preventing the concentration of economic power than
state anti-trust policies, which nevertheless are indispensable. Here,
Liberals have the social responsibility  to act as guardians.
The interdependence of economic order and market behaviour can perhaps
best be shown by the example of sports. However important the behaviour
of the competitors and their game plans are for winning, the very rules
of the game assure fair competition and the success of the match
altogether. As long as the rules of the game are fair and are honestly
respected, the moves of the individual players or the team enhance the
performance of the participants and the success of the match.
In market processes as in sports the rules of the game do not exclude an
even fairer behaviour than requested. On the contrary, experience shows
that fairness in competition beyond the rules has a positive effect on the
reputation of the player. It may perhaps already signal a further
development of the ethics of competition and may in the long run even
lead to an adjustment of the rules of competition.
In a market economy things are very similar: if the legal and economic
order corresponds to liberal requirements, the citizen who follows the
laws of fair competition can assume that his actions are socially valuable,
and benefit society even though he is pursuing his own interests (in a
wider sense). An essential part of the ethical and social dimension of
liberal policy is already contained in the legal and economic order, which
6influences the citizens’ actions5. Comparable to sports, the conditions of
the system of rules to a large extent shape the structure of incentives for
actions in politics as well as in the economy. And competition in sports
as well as in society and the economy takes into account the system of
rules and incentives. This by no means excludes that customs and civic
ethics make stricter demands on social behaviour than those inherent in
the rules of the ordering framework - the ethical minimum so to speak.
On the contrary, with the level of prosperity the expectations of social
behaviour grow along with other demands. And of course liberal policy
envisages responsible individuals creatively and voluntarily engaged in
the small communities of the civil society as well as in the larger arena
of the state. One of the very aims of liberal policy is to strengthen the
citizen’s acceptance of this responsibility by granting greater autonomy.
Consequently, the social dimension of liberal policy is not to be found
primarily in the repair shop of the social process where the social policies
of the government are supposed to correct the results of competition
and the market forces. To reduce the social dimension to this kind of
repair shop, and presuppose a contradiction of social concerns and market
policies, is a widely held basic misunderstanding. It gets intensified by
most one-sided quotations of examples of so-called “market failures“,
which serve as an excuse to again call for state intervention, usually
without considering the much more serious “failures of the state“. The
social dimension of Liberalism does not so much mean post facto repairs,
but it is first of all  inherent in the model of society itself, in its legal and
economic order, which guarantees the right to property, and channels
competition by rules aiming at the common good6.
Liberal policy proves its social efficacy first of all via the markets, via
market-oriented policies, and the application of incentives, which are
part of the economic order. They are contained in a legal and economic
order which reflects the social and ethical concerns of society in the
5 Karl Homann/Eckart Blome-Drees,  op.cit.
6 Karl Homann, Sozialpolitik nicht gegen den Markt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.2.
1999, p. 15; Homann/Blome-Drees, Unternehmensethik, op.cit.; H. Müller-Groeling, Unter-
nehmensethik in einer Sozialen Marktwirtschaft nach deutschem Vorbild, in: Zeitschrift der
deutsch-polnischen Handelskammer, Nr.7/89, 1999.
7sense of a minimal code. An assumed contradiction between market
economics and social policies does not do justice to liberal policy, what
is more, it ignores the essential elements of its social efficacy.
The Social Function of Markets
The freedom of the citizen is the essential concern of liberal policy.
Freedom constrains the powers of government and society vis-à-vis the
individual. Freedom, of course, also means responsibility of the individual
for the consequences of his actions for himself, his family as well as
society.
It is, however, not just a question of “freedom from...“, i.e. of the maximum
freedom from state coercion and corporative tutelage, which is of course
an important freedom. But it is also a matter of “freedom for“. And here
the essential element is the freedom of choice, the freedom of every
single citizen to organise his life according to his preference and in his
own responsibility within the framework of the legal and economic order,
taking into consideration the freedom of others as well as accepting
their competition.
To achieve this, alternatives are needed; for participation in the public
sphere, of course, political alternatives are required. However, Liberalism
is concerned not only with the freedom of choice at the ballot box and
the expansion of plebiscitary elements but also with the freedom of choice
in organising one’s personal life. Freedom of choice should not be
understood as restricted to its economic dimension, its value must be
understood in a comprehensive way.
To guarantee this freedom of choice, to offer a multitude of alternatives,
the market, market economic policy, is an indispensable, a social, albeit
often misunderstood, instrument. Market economic policy is based on a
fundamental guarantee of property and on free markets within the
framework of a legal and economic order. Free Markets allow a free
exchange of goods and services, free competition, and free co-operation.
These are also the pillars of a liberal society. A liberal society requires the
existence of markets where – within the legal framework – there is free
8exchange, but also competition as an incentive as well as a limitation of
economic power. Last not least it requires free co-operation,the
importance of which for a free market system is often overlooked and
not sufficiently appreciated.
One must also not underestimate the importance of free exchange. In
the market process and via market prices a central problem for economic
progress, the information problem (on preferences and economic scarcity),
is being solved. As the unsuccessful experiments of centrally planned
economies show, the information problem can only be solved in a
decentralised manner. With decentralisation and through market-
economic incentives as well as the competitive process, which is at the
same time a process of discovery,7 liberal policy achieves a high degree of
efficiency and technical as well as economic progress. These policies gene-
rate an astonishing growth of wealth, particularly in industrial countries
(but not only there). Strangely, its extent often goes unnoticed, particularly
as large parts of it are consumed in an increase in leisure time and a
reduction of the working life span. Last not least wealth has contributed
to the remarkable rise of life expectancy. It is this increase in wealth in a
wider sense which constitutes an important part of the social dimension
of liberal policy.
The function of market-economic policy is often misunderstood since
the concept of the market is being limited to the markets of consumer
goods and because this policy is often seen as mere satisfaction of material
needs. This overlooks the fact that services like concerts, theatres,
exhibitions, lectures, and more are also subject to market transactions,
hence cultural conceit vis-à-vis the market is a sign of ignorance rather
than of moral superiority.
It is frequently overlooked that important decisions in life relate to
markets. Choices at the labour, housing, education, and financial markets
show how important these markets are for the autonomy of the individual
and that there is no reason for prejudices against liberal policy, which
trusts in the market.
7 Friedrich von Hayek, Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, Kieler Vorträge, Nr. 58,
Tübingen 1968.
9The Example of the Labour Market
Chronically high unemployment in Germany demonstrates what happens
if the play of the market forces is not allowed and the market is
overregulated. Involuntary unemployment is a social fate reaching far
beyond questions of wages and salaries because it harms the social status
and the self-esteem of the victims. It is here that the social dimension of
liberal policy becomes especially evident, a policy which aims at the
creation of a functioning labour market and by this at the reduction of
unemployment. It does this by market economic means, namely by
deregulation and improved flexibility, measures  which have proven to
be feasible in other countries. A liberal labour market policy would, among
other measures, have to guarantee the individual’s right to accept work
at market conditions if offered (in hardship cases with payment of income
supplements). A liberal labour market policy is social for three reasons:
Firstly, it can prevent that union and management – within the present
state-supported constitution of the labour market – reach agreements
at the expense of third parties, namely the unemployed and the taxpayers.
Secondly, this policy makes it more difficult for shirkers to evade their
responsibility to support themselves and their families at the cost of
society.
But thirdly, the most important aspect is that improving the flexibility of
the legislation pertaining to the labour market would make a decisive
contribution to the reduction of  unemployment. Unemployment, given
its socially negative side effects, is absolutely the most unsocial feature
our society affords, in spite of claims that the relevant labour and labour
market legislation is “social“. This clearly shows that liberal policy is often
much more social than the mere expansion of the conventional, partly
protectionist social legislation and the policies of social security.
Subsidiarity
Liberal policy first of all secures and challenges the freedom of the citizens
by facilitating and encouraging autonomous decisions with personal
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responsibility. Freedom, independence, and personal responsibility, the
development and measuring of strength in competition as well as in free
co-operation in the market, are core values of a specific liberal image of
man. These values are closely linked to an important principle of social
organisation, the principle of subsidiarity, which is often quoted but rarely
taken as seriously as it deserves8. It is a fundamental liberal principle, yet
its importance is sometimes underestimated even by Liberals. Interestingly,
the principle of subsidiarity has been formulated stringently in the
encyclical “Quadragesimo Anno“ (1931) where it is quoted as “the highest
socio-philosophical principle“ . It says in the language of this encyclical:
“Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can
accomplish by their own initiative and give it to the community, so also
it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of
right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and
subordinate organisations can do“9.
Free Markets, Economic Dynamics,
and Scope for Genuine Solidarity
The existence of free markets and a market-oriented policy are essential
safeguards of freedom and co-operation without dominance. Free markets
are of fundamental value for the individual, for his independence and
the organisation of his life, and this irrespective of the arguments in
favour of a free market economic order relating to efficiency and growth.
As history has shown, free markets are the basis of a democratic society
because of their fundamental importance for the freedom of choice and
particularly because of the interdependence of orders (Walter Eucken),
and therefore they constitute the core of liberal policy.
Liberal policy with its emphasis on and defence of the market economic
system also contributes to the dynamics of the economy and hence to
the well-being and affluence of society. A freedom-based economic order
with a system of free markets not only facilitates autonomous decision
making. By its incentive mechanisms this order also activates the
8 The Politics of the European Union with the lip service to subsidiarity is an example.
9 See  www.osjspm.org/cst/qa.htm.
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productive forces as well as the striving for excellence. And it creates
scope for genuine (not enforced) solidarity through private charities, but
also for public assistance to the really needy.
Markets and Equal Treatment
An important feature of the markets is that in principle they guarantee
equal treatment of the citizens and hence also their non-discrimination.
Equal treatment is an integral part of the social dimension of liberal
policy.
At markets, the point at issue is not (private) altruism towards the family,
which goes without saying. Neither should market behaviour be a question
of cohesion, camaraderie, or cliquishness vis-à-vis small groups,
associations, and parties (in short of crony capitalism or corporatism).
Free Markets mean equality of opportunity, which is a core value of libe-
ral policies, not equality of results (different matters will surely be treated
differently). They mean non-discrimination also of foreigners, but they
also mean competition.10  This equal treatment of the near ones and the
far ones, this non-discrimination often earns markets and liberal market
protagonists the reproach of “social coldness“. But non-discrimination is
an essential element of social policies and the “good society“. Markets
obviously economise on altruism – a very rare good – so that it can come
into its rightful place at the appropriate occasion (Hayek).
Selfishness, Altruism, and Social Justice
Often market choices have been contrasted to political choices to show
that choices at the markets are guided by selfish, but political choices by
altruistic concerns. However, one needs to consider that market choices
are generally paid for by the individual with his own means whereas in
political choices the individual can legitimately take care  that he is the
beneficiary himself. If the citizen votes for social measures benefiting
others, he can at least hope not to contribute his full share or even
10 Herbert Giersch, Das Wirtschaftswachstum in Zeiten der Globalisierung, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 15.1.2000, p. 15.
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nothing to their financing. For good reasons elections have been compared
with auctions (Roland Vaubel) as they are often about the distribution of
social benefits. Seen from this point of view, market decisions appear in
a different, more social light, and the common argument that political
choices as opposed to market decisions are more strongly influenced by
altruism seems doubtful. And it becomes more easily understandable
why liberal policies rely in many ways on the system of markets and
market decisions.
Also in another context liberal policy relies on the processes of market
competition: in the much debated question of “social justice“. Given
differing interests, it is rarely possible to reach consensus as to when a
distribution result can be considered just. Hence Friedrich von Hayek -
who denies the term “social justice“ any content - suggests to aim at
“justice of procedure“ rather than “justice of results“11. Following this
proposition, liberal policy prefers – analogous to competition in sports -
competition in the markets within the framework of rules set by the
legal and economic order. And liberal policy also strives for the
improvement of these rules and, of course, also for corrections of the
results for those who cannot participate in this competition, partially or
not at all.
By increasing affluence, by constraining the role of the state, and by
generous fiscal rules Liberalism wants to create financial scope for pri-
vate provisions as well as for private charities and government assistance
for the truly needy. Liberal policy wants to encourage a mind-set of pri-
vate philanthropy as it exists in other countries under more favourable
legal conditions12. To perceive as “social“ only aspects concerning the
demands of the individual on the collective is the result of breeding an
entitlement mentality thanks to the provision of complete security
benefits by the state. These benefits due to their system and due to their
exploitation could well turn out to be either insufficient or impossible to
finance.
11 Friedrich von Hayek, Drei Vorlesungen über Demokratie, Gerechtigkeit und Sozialismus, Tü-
bingen 1977, p. 23, and The Fiction of Social Justice, in: New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics and the History of Ideas, London 1978.
12 Karl-Heinz Paqué, Philanthropie und Steuerpolitik, Kieler Studie 203, Tübingen 1986.
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Economic Progress
Free Market Policy trusts in economic dynamism generated by a
combination of individual initiatives and suitable incentive systems. Free
trade with goods and services and free movement of capital facilitate
the world-wide division of labour, and serve the “wealth of nations“.
Economic growth and the increase in wealth – national and internatio-
nal – are of central importance for the social dimension of liberal policy.
This even more so as economic growth has the tendency to accelerate,
and depends increasingly more on knowledge and research than on raw
materials and industrial production. This facilitates the efforts at
sustainability of economic activities. But also the social dimension of
one of the main focuses of liberal policy – the promotion of knowledge
and education – gains in importance; and for the individual it opens
chances to apply his personal talents13.
The acceleration of economic growth is not without problems. Growth
always means structural change, and increases not only chances but
also risks. It demands flexibility and willingness to adapt, and it strains
social cohesion. Knowledge and capital become obsolete more rapidly,
and social differentiation may grow. All this is not without dangers for
liberal ideas. It may intensify the call for the state and for equality (not
of opportunities but of results), and generate opposition against the very
conditions which favour economic progress. Much of this derives from
resistance to change, from lack of education and flexibility. But it may
also result from misconceptions about the conditions of wealth and
economic growth as well as the role of the state; misconceptions which,
however, cannot easily be removed.
Globalisation and Liberal Policy
If we talk of social policy, strangely enough,  we mainly think of domestic
problems. Even the social deliberations of those who desire a multicultural
society get stuck in domestic reflections, at least when the political
13 Differences in talents will of course lead to different results, but that should not be a cause
of levelling down, neither in education nor in its results.
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discussion transcends the payment of development aid. This, too, may be
a consequence of the sole focus on the systems of social security – which
are in many ways not social at all – that contributed in a large measure
to wrongly viewing the social aspects of a society’s order in a very narrow
perspective.
The discussion about the world economic order and globalisation offers
a lesson on the social component of liberal policy. Here, too, the social
dimension of liberal policy does not primarily consist of paying
development aid. Beyond the development of cultural relations and
economic and technical co-operation, liberal policy creates free markets
for trade, investment, and services. It stands for free access to the markets
of the industrial countries also for suppliers from developing countries
so that everybody who so desires can participate in the worldwide division
of labour without discrimination.
With a narrow view on the home market, globalisation is often perceived
as a danger for the unskilled labourers. They now have to face the pressures
of competition from so-called low wage countries, that is from workers
in the Third World and in the reforming states of Eastern Europe ( “Hong
Kong at the doorstep“). Jobs for unskilled workers in the industrial
countries are indeed endangered without the necessary structural
adjustments, which essentially consist of better training and lifelong
learning, but also of spreading the wages and incomes scales.
On the other hand globalisation offers equality of chances to the much
poorer workers in developing countries. It becomes possible for them to
participate in the advantages of the division of labour, and thus earn
their income or raise their standard of living.
Another result of the expansion of the international division of labour -
called globalisation – is that the participating states and their policies
increasingly get checked by locational competition. Due to this
competition they lose part of their power over their citizens, and state
interventionism is forced back. It becomes more difficult to further reduce
the disposable income of the citizens by taxes and contributions to various
social services as long as the benefits derived are not considered to be
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sufficient. Similar consequences will be felt by corporate associations
which draw their power from market protection. Not everybody will
welcome the limitation of the power of the state, particularly not those
who nurse high expectations from state intervention, and concede a strong
role to the state14.
But in principle locational competition leads – fully in harmony with
liberal principles – to another expansion of choices for the citizens. And
it pushes back the power of the regulating and taxing state and its
intermediary fiscal authorities, and concomitantly improves the conditions
of competition world wide.
The Danger of Protectionism
The temptation, however, is strong not to accept the claims of the social
principle, to define the collective of beneficiaries - “us“ - very narrowly,
and to protect oneself  from undesirable competition “from outside“. In
this context it is easy to approve of social benefits in the form of
development aid, particularly when paid for by others, but to refuse the
free access to markets and free competition by painting horror scenarios
of globalisation.
In international economic relations there are many ways to prevent
competition. Not all of them will easily be recognised as protectionist.
This is true for free-trade coalitions in the form of  a customs union (or
more). Within such formations, as is well known, there exists not only
trade creation but also trade diversion, the latter to the disadvantage of
the non-members and to the  advantage of the members. This is an offence
against the most favoured nation principle of the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO), which stipulates that all advantages conceded to one trading
nation have to be given to all others.
Even more dangerous elements of discrimination (and of protectionism)
are standards which on the surface sail under the “social“ flag, but are
often used as instruments of protectionism by being forced on the trading
14 There is also the argument of a “race to the bottom“, the fear that in the competition for
location there will be no end to the lowering of taxes, but reality does not seem to prove it.
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partners. They are so dangerous because they appear to be socially
beneficial, as social or environmental standards for instance, but as
standards forced on trading partners they can often be socially most
harmful. How can workers from Bangladesh be competitive if they have
to conform to the social legislation standards of industrial nations? At
home and abroad it is not necessarily socially responsible to improve the
lives of those who are employed, but it is social to give a chance to the
unemployed. Or: should and could a more affluent country not afford
stricter standards of environmental protection than a poorer one? Is it
social to prevent workers from less developed member countries of the
European Union by wage regulation from competing by means of lower
wages with those in the more advanced member states?
Contrary to all these attempts to defend one’s own privileges against the
poor by a dubious policy of social justice, to prevent or at least obstruct
their access to the markets, a liberal policy of world trade with its central
rules of non-discrimination and most favoured nation treatment presents
a vigorous social profile. And this without taking recourse to development
aid, which, however, – like social security at home – should not be
excluded.
Liberal Policy and Social Policies
We have to avoid a misunderstanding: we are here discussing the social
dimension of liberal policy and not the liberal views on social security as
for instance practiced in contemporary Germany. If we were talking about
liberal social politics in this narrow sense, we would have to discuss the
consequences of liberal principles applied to the security systems against
the economic hazards of risks like illness, old age, disability, geriatric
care, and unemployment.
One would have to debate whether the redistribution of the individual’s
life income forced on the citizen by the state, whether the incapacitation
of the citizen by state statutory insurance systems against the economic
risks in life are compatible with liberal principles. And particularly one
needs to ask the question: given the considerable increase in wealth, are
such statutory insurance systems still as appropriate as they might have
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been at the time of their introduction? Furthermore, one would have to
ask: are these systems with their pay-as-you-go practice still operational
in view of the shrinking population, and do they guarantee a minimum
of interpersonal and especially intergenerational justice? In short, one
would have to discuss how – from a liberal point of view – the citizens
should nowadays make provisions against these and other risks of life.
Obviously such a discussion, for instance regarding old age insurance,
would lead to proposals strongly emphasising autonomy and individual
private insurance based on the funding principle, possibly with a minimum
insurance stipulated by legislation as it exists in the insurance against
third-party risk for car owners to avoid moral hazards15. Similarly, in
respect to protection from economic risks of illness (‘health insurance’)
there would be proposals which more strongly stress the freedom of
choice and private insurance with different forms of refunding and
retention. Here, too, one could consider  a mandatory minimum insurance
as a concession to society because of the ubiquitous moral hazard16.
It is important to recognise that liberal policy like the traditional social
security policies is concerned with the protection of the individual against
the economic risks of life. The social dimension of Liberalism means to
appeal first of all to the individual and his responsibility, not to
immediately establish claims on society, thereby allowing within certain
limits the freedom of choice. Liberal policies of protection against risks
derive their specifically social dimensions from trying to prevent contracts
at the expense of third parties as they are commonly the result of
negotiations on the state systems of social security. The most telling
example is the old age insurance where the negotiating parties often
have reached agreements at the expense of the taxpayer and the next
generations with the catchwords of solidarity and “intergenerational
contract“.
15 Roland Vaubel, Reforming Social Security for Old Age and Comment by H. Müller-Groeling
in: Herbert Giersch (Ed.), Reassessing the Role of Government in the Mixed Economy, Tübin-
gen 1983, pp. 173 ff, 191 ff.
16 See Liberales Institut der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Grundsätze liberaler Sozialpolitik -
12 Thesen, in: Otto Graf Lambsdorf (Hrsg.), Freiheit und Soziale Verantwortung, Grundsätze
liberaler Sozialpolitik, Frankfurt a.M. 2001. Mimeo English version: Principles of Liberal
Social Policy – 12 Propositions
18
In spite of the liberal criticism of the existing systems it has to be made
clear that liberal policy must not lose sight of responsibilities towards
the really needy. The fact that liberal policy is based more on the general
increase in wealth, on private initiative, communities, and networks does
not mean that one is not willing to provide the necessary funds for those
in need. On the contrary, to strive for economic progress, to try to avoid
windfall gains, and to concentrate  social welfare on those really in need,
means that they can be effectively helped.
Freedom and Responsibility within the Community
Liberal policy has per se an important social dimension. It is based on a
model of society which is intrinsically social, and safeguards the freedom
of the individual to fulfil his life plan in the civil society. He should be
able to do so autonomously, in his own reponsibility, and as far as possible
free from intervention by the state – in competition as well as in co-
operation with others. This, of course, in a legal and economic order
which should guarantee that the competitive behaviour of the individual
does not solely benefit him or his communities in the civil society, but
society in general, and that competition is fair in the sense of procedural
justice. And liberal policy relies on economic dynamism unleashed by
such a system. It also relies on the education of the citizens as a value
per se and on the techno-economic progress and the increase in wealth
that follows from it. To achieve this, a system of free markets is
indispensable which permits the free exchange of goods, services, and
capital also beyond national borders. Also indispensable are free market
policies, which guarantee the necessary openness and functioning of the
markets and the restriction of market power. The constraint of market
power is one of the assignments of the state. The state should be cut
back to its genuine tasks (like for instance internal and external security),
which then should really be taken seriously.
The attempt at measuring the social content of liberal policy by the
traditional social policies or even by increases in the state statutory
insurance systems is misleading. Liberal policy has a social dimension,
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which by far transcends social policies in a narrow sense because this
dimension is contained in the liberal blueprint of society itself.
In social security policies the principles of Liberalism lead to relying more
strongly on the freedom and responsibility of the individual, who should
decide on the protection against the economic risks of life for himself
and his family within a wide range of choices, a method where the funding
principle and differentiation of insurance tariffs would automatically gain
in weight. At the same time windfall gains will be prevented so that the
available means can be concentrated on the assistance to the genuinely
needy.
In its market economic policies, Liberalism believes in a legal and economic
order based on the principles of freedom and in the protection of property.
It believes in market ethics, which have developed in the course of history,
in the responsibility and self-interest of the citizens as well as in the
dynamics of competition. Liberalism defends and maintains the freedom
of the citizen from state tutelage and the power of corporate associations.
However, together with the freedom granted to the individual citizen
liberal policy not only burdens him with the responsibility for himself
and his family, but also with responsibility for active co-operation in
small communities and in the civil society. Liberal policy is a far cry from
the misconception of a “wrong individualism“ (Hayek), which nearly totally
isolates the individual from sharing responsibility in the creative shaping
of society.
Dr. Hubertus Müller-Groeling, Professor and former Vice President of the
Kiel Institute of World Economy, is a member of the Board of Directors of
the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
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